In aggressive interactions, animals often use a discrete set of signals, while the properties being signalled are likely to be continuous, for example fighting ability or value of victory. Here we investigate a particular model of fighting that allows for conventional signalling of subjective resource value to occur. Perfect signalling and no signalling are not evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in the model. Instead, we find ESSs in which partial information is communicated, with discrete displays signalling a range of values rather than a precise one. The result also indicates that communication should be more precise in conflicts over small resources. Signalling strategies can exist in fighting because of the common interest in avoiding injuries, but communication is likely to be limited because of the fundamental conflict over the resource. Our results reflect a compromise between these two factors. Data allowing for a thorough test of the model are lacking; however, existing data seem consistent with the obtained theoretical results.
Animals signalling in aggressive interactions use displays that are predominantly discrete (Cullen 1966; P. L. Hurd & M. Enquist, unpublished data) , while the underlying properties being signalled are almost certainly continuous (e.g. relative fighting ability or estimated value of victory). It seems somewhat paradoxical that discrete displays should be used to signal continuous properties. One explanation is that the reduction in probability of errors in transmission favours discrete signals (Morris 1957) . Johnstone (1994) has modelled the evolution of this effect in the Sir Philip Sydney game.
An alternative explanation is that there is some strategic value in using an ambiguous signal. Enquist (1985, model II) demonstrated this effect in a two-signal model. Here we present a generalized version of the model, analysing it further with respect to the tendency towards the use of discrete conventional displays.
MODEL AND RESULTS
Enquist (1985, model II) examined a situation in which two contestants meet over a nondivisible resource of some given size. The value, v, of this resource varies between contestants, so that different individuals are said to have different subjective resource values. When the contest starts each player knows its own subjective resource value but not that of the opponent.
The contest proceeds in one or two steps. In the first step each player shows a signal, or decides to give up, based on its own subjective resource value. Players act simultaneously. If both decide to give up, the resource is randomly awarded to one of them. If one player gives up, the resource is awarded to the other. No costs are paid in these cases. If both players give a signal the contest proceeds to the second step, in which the contestants simultaneously decide whether to give up, or attack (and fight) based on the opponent's signal and their own subjective resource value. The minimum expected cost of a physical fight is c and additional costs of fighting depend on how willing the two players are to persist in an escalated contest. We refer to c as the 'initial cost' of fighting. As shown below, the cost c is crucial for the stability of a signalling strategy, since it is the only factor that prevents bluffing. In reality, such a cost may arise from attacks by the opponent that cannot be avoided, even if the animal tries to flee. Enquist (1985) considered the following communication strategy S: if v is above a threshold v 1 signal 1 is used; if v i 1 dv>v i then signal i is used and so on, and if v≤v n 1 then the decision is to give up (we can say that signal n is giving up). The contest proceeds to the second step if both players signal. If they use different signals, the individual that used the signal indicating the lowest subjective resource value decides to give up (i.e. the signal with the higher index). If both players use the same signal they fight. This strategy reveals only some information about the state of the signaller, as each signal indicates a range of subjective resource values.
